As coding models and agent harnesses become more capable, reliable security verification is becoming a central bottleneck. Improving secure code generation requires a signal whose reported progress remains aligned with actual program behavior under optimization; otherwise, an optimizer can improve the signal's verdict without removing the underlying vulnerability. Existing model-based approaches require models to either infer program behavior from source code or specify correct outcomes for adversarial tests, placing substantial reasoning demands on the security signal. We introduce \falcon{}, a counterexample-grounded verification framework that separates attack exploration from behavioral verification and connects them through execution traces of the program under test. In test-time repair, \falcon{} yields substantially stronger held-out functional-security gains than alternative security signals across secure code generation benchmarks, while preserving or improving functionality. As an RL reward, \falcon{} also outperforms static-analysis and learned rewards on held-out functional-security, even when all policies successfully optimize their respective training rewards. Combining \falcon{} with either proxy reward further improves held-out performance, suggesting that execution-grounded feedback can mitigate reward overoptimization while preserving useful guidance from existing security signals.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.25916
Machine learning benchmarks act as guideposts for model development and spur the creation of training datasets intended to improve benchmark scores. We introduce BenchDoor, a family of data poisoning attacks that exploits this incentive. Beyond preserving benign performance, BenchDoor requires benchmark gains that encourage adoption of data that also implants a backdoor. The adversary either manipulates a benchmark's training or test data, creating an adversarial benchmark, or supplies an independent training dataset while leaving the benchmark unchanged. We formalize five attack scenarios, including training on rewritten test examples and applying similarity-based decontamination. Across multiple-choice Q&A, text classification, and open-ended Q&A with Qwen and Gemma models, BenchDoor achieves positive benchmark gains for all 30 evaluated configurations, with held-out attack success rates of 82.33% to 100.00% at poisoning rates of 2% to 10%. Both objectives remain achievable after synthetic data generation and similarity-based decontamination, with attack success rates of at least 90.33%. These findings show how benchmarks can serve as attack vectors both through their own data and through training resources that deliver improvements on them.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.27533
Mitigating catastrophic risks from large language models requires excising hazardous operational capabilities, such as cyberwarfare exploitation and pathogen enhancement, without degrading benign scientific utility. In these dual-use domains, legitimate defensive science and malicious attacks share vocabulary, syntax, and internal model representations, causing standard unlearning methods to induce severe collateral damage (concept bleeding). In this work, we present Orthogonal Boundary Unlearning (OBU), a mathematically grounded framework designed to eliminate collateral damage on benign dual-use capabilities. OBU extracts a domain-matched capability subspace from paired calibration queries via singular value decomposition on empirical activation covariances, and restricts parameter updates strictly to the orthogonal null space. This guarantees that benign representations experience zero parameter perturbation along the spanned calibration subspace. We present two complementary realizations of OBU: Projected LoRA, which applies the orthogonal constraint during iterative gradient-based fine-tuning, and Closed-Form Weight Surgery, which directly edits model weights in a single analytical step without training. Across four modern open-weight foundation models (Gemma-3-4B, Qwen3.5-4B, SmolLM3-3B, and Granite-4.2-3B), OBU achieves strong dual-use concept separation, substantially mitigates in-context priming attacks, and demonstrates durable resistance against adversarial relearning without degrading benign domain competence.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.27490
The growing use of autonomous artificial intelligence agents in digital commerce creates new security concerns involving agent impersonation, unauthorized payments, compromised agents, and misuse of delegated authority. This research introduces the Autonomous Commerce Agent Guard System (ACAGS), a cybersecurity framework combining supervised machine learning, behavioral analytics, agent-specific authorization controls, and explainable AI. The framework was evaluated using synthetic financial transaction data augmented with simulated agent characteristics and five adversarial scenarios. XGBoost was selected following comparisons with alternative classifiers. Across ten experimental runs, behavioral features improved mean F1-score from 52.12% to 67.49%, with agent-specific features increasing performance to 69.46%. The framework achieved detection rates of 99.77% for abnormal agent behavior, 99.73% for impersonation, and 100% for malicious delegation and authorization-scope violations. Compromised-agent detection reached 72.27%. ACAGS also supported APPROVE, REVIEW, and REJECT authorization outcomes, with SHAP explanations providing model interpretability. The results demonstrate the potential of combining behavioral intelligence and delegated authorization controls to strengthen simulated agentic-commerce payment security, while highlighting the need for validation using real-world transactions.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.27483
Federated learning (FL) is a distributed machine learning paradigm that reduces transmission costs, mitigates cross-border data sharing restrictions, and enhances privacy by keeping raw data on local devices. Clients in FL systems train local models and share only updates, which are aggregated by a central server. While this setup limits direct data exposure, FL remains vulnerable to privacy attacks. Existing attack and defense strategies have largely been developed for centralized systems, and adapting them to FL introduces new challenges due to its unique architecture and training workflow. In this work, we first propose a model inversion attack on FL systems using Deep Convolutional Generative Adversarial Networks (DCGANs) in the context of large-scale medical imaging. Our method operates under realistic assumptions about the attacker's knowledge and capabilities. We then examine the effect of client-side differential privacy (DP) in mitigating privacy leakage and incorporate personalized FL to improve model performance under DP settings. Experiments on the Brain MRI ND-5 dataset show that DCGAN-based attacks can reconstruct semantically meaningful synthetic images, revealing significant risks to the privacy of training data. Applying DP reduces attack success but introduces an accuracy trade-off, which is further overcome by personalized FL at each client side. We also evaluate how different aggregation algorithms affect both attack vulnerability and defense effectiveness, underscoring the critical role of aggregation strategies. The proposed attack-and-defense framework is model-agnostic and applicable to a wide range of FL-based systems.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.27470
Beneath the apparent diversity of foundation models lies an increasingly homogeneous technical stack of common training pipelines, distillation methods, and data. These shared algorithmic choices can expose an otherwise distinct model ecosystem to concentrated risks leading to a vulnerability monoculture. Yet current practice in assessing adversarial robustness is restricted to individual robustness scores and attack transfer rates, leaving open the unexplored fundamental question: how many attacks suffice for catastrophic widespread compromise? In this paper, we investigate the empirical nature of shared vulnerabilities within a model pool and introduce Systemic Adversarial Robustness (SAR), a novel measure of shared vulnerability of a model pool through the attack diversity needed to exploit it. Specifically, SAR interpolates between single-attack transferability and independent per-model robustness: small values reveal a vulnerability monoculture, whereas large values indicate that failures are dispersed across models. We theoretically formulate SAR as a partial set-cover problem with provable approximation guarantees---enabling the development of scalable algorithms to empirically measure the systemic adversarial robustness. We empirically test the shared vulnerability of vision and large language models and characterize their shared collective vulnerability curve. Specifically, we demonstrate that model pools distilled from DeepSeek-R1 and Claude Opus 4.6 exhibit lower estimated systemic robustness than their corresponding parent pools, revealing a potential systemic cost of frontier-model distillation. Our framework seeks to establish vulnerability monoculture as a measurable target for a more wholistic adversarial evaluation of model populations.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.27353
Safe Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (SMARL) aims to learn cooperative control policies under prescribed safety constraints. Al- though existing SMARL methods focus on enforcing safety during policy optimization, their vulnerability remains largely unexplored. This paper investigates inference-time observation attacks against SMARL, where an adversary perturbs the observations of a subset of agents, thereby altering the actions produced by their policies. We propose MinMax Attack, an attack framework that jointly selects adversarial target actions for compromised agents while accounting for the Cooperative Resistance of benign agents. We further derive a bound on the induced safety cost and characterize its relation- ship with the Compromised-Agent Budget and the Perturbation Budget. Experiments across multiple safety-critical multi-agent benchmarks and representative state-of-the-art SMARL algorithms show that MinMax Attack induces substantially higher safety costs than existing attack baselines while preserving task reward, thereby reducing its detectability and achieving both attack effectiveness and stealthiness.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.27293
Deep neural networks have achieved remarkable success on vision benchmarks, yet they continue to struggle with many generalization challenges. Supervised vision training relies on one-hot labels, which provide limited information about semantic structure and shared attributes between classes. This limited supervision can leave visual representations vulnerable to distribution shifts, spurious correlations, texture bias, adversarial perturbations, and forgetting in sequential learning settings. We study whether pretrained language models can serve as lightweight auxiliary supervision for vision training without requiring paired image-text data, prompt engineering, or contrastive objectives. Specifically, we evaluate two forms of language guidance, Explicit Language Guidance (ExLG) and Implicit Language Guidance (ImLG). We conduct a comprehensive evaluation across six generalization regimes, including in-distribution, out-of-distribution generalization, shortcut and spurious correlation resistance, texture and shape bias, adversarial robustness, and continual learning. Our analyses show that the two mechanisms have complementary strengths, with explicit guidance consistently benefiting in-distribution, low-data performance, and continual learning retention, while implicit guidance is often more useful in shortcut-sensitive settings and under stronger adversarial perturbations. Importantly, both are lightweight and add minimal parameters and training overhead. The analyses characterize when language-derived structure helps supervised vision training and provides a practical roadmap for using off-the-shelf pretrained models from another modality as auxiliary supervision.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.27208
Neural networks (NNs) are increasingly deployed on edge devices such as mobile and IoT platforms, offering low latency and improved privacy compared to cloud-based deployment. However, on-device models embedded in mobile applications can be unpacked and exposed to adversaries, enabling cross-node attacks in centrally distributed ecosystems, where adversarial examples crafted on one compromised device transfer effectively to other nodes sharing the same models. To address this threat, we propose VeilNN, a defense framework that reduces adversarial transferability across on-device models via model obfuscation. The core idea of VeilNN is to introduce controlled model diversity while preserving original task functionality. Specifically, VeilNN applies stealthy and irreversible obfuscation at both the architectural and parameter levels through network cell obfuscation and layer assembling, and is applicable to diverse NN architectures, including MLPs, CNNs, and Vision Transformers. Extensive experiments demonstrate that VeilNN effectively defends against cross-node attacks, achieving an average defense success of 49.19% and up to 81.19% across four adversarial attack types, with more than 33.16% improvement over existing defenses.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.27152
With the advancement of powerful AI chips, on-device machine learning is gaining traction for its low latency and privacy protection. However, when edge devices are compromised, attackers can obtain white-box access to the deployed models by reversing the apps directly to obtain the knowledge of peer devices, which is known as Cross-Node Attacks, like performing efficient adversarial attacks. Most existing defenses target known vulnerabilities, yet white-box access still enables attackers to uncover more unknown weaknesses. This creates a critical risk for edge-device deployments, where one compromised device can endanger all models distributed from the same source. Motivated by findings that the model robustness is primarily influenced by the curvature of the decision boundary, we investigate how model parameters shape its curvature. In this paper, we propose a novel method, BMO, that obfuscates model parameters to diversify the decision boundary further resisting cross-node attack while preserving its benign accuracy. Specifically, we explore decomposing model parameters into boundary-position and boundary-curvature components based on null-space constraints, then models with differentiated decision boundaries are instantiated by injecting noise into the boundary-curvature component. Across all four major types of adversarial attacks with four widely-deployed on-device models, BMO achieves an average success rate of 68.68% in defense, far exceeding the most competitive baseline, which attains only 22.32% in defending against cross-node attacks. Moreover, BMO achieves comparable performance in benign accuracy compared with baselines.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.27135
Mathematical reasoning is a fundamental capability for educational applications of Large Language Models (LLMs), where reliable problem solving requires not only correct answers but also coherent and verifiable reasoning processes. Multi-agent systems (MASs) have shown growing potential in this domain by leveraging collaboration and verification among multiple LLM agents. However, existing evaluations primarily focus on the correctness of final answers in text-only settings, offering limited insight into multimodal reasoning capabilities, the reliability of intermediate reasoning steps, and robustness against reasoning errors. To address these limitations, we introduce MAMath-Bench, a process-aware benchmark designed to evaluate the multimodal mathematical reasoning capabilities of MASs. MAMath-Bench comprises 1,003 problems spanning 11 mathematical categories, multiple difficulty levels, and several modalities, including text, images, and audio. It features fine-grained milestone annotations to evaluate systems across three dimensions: problem-solving correctness, reasoning-process reliability, and robustness to adversarial reasoning-chain perturbations. Our evaluation yields three key findings. First, multi-agent collaboration does not consistently improve final-answer accuracy over strong single LLMs. Second, collaboration can substantially enhance the coverage of intermediate reasoning, but such gains may come at the cost of increased reasoning redundancy. Third, current systems remain vulnerable to adversarial reasoning errors, particularly those involving subtle structural perturbations. The dataset is available at this https URL.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.26943
Pixel-space diffusion models have recently re-emerged as a compelling alternative to latent diffusion, avoiding the lossy latent bottleneck and separately trained autoencoder. JiT shows that a vanilla diffusion transformer can generate directly in pixel space by replacing the commonly used velocity prediction ($\boldsymbol{u}$-prediction) with clean image prediction ($\boldsymbol{x_0}$-prediction). In this work, we revisit this choice and introduce MFlow, an adaptive parameterization that learns to interpolate between $\boldsymbol{x_0}$- and $\boldsymbol{u}$-prediction across principal directions of the data, learned end-to-end with diffusion training. We find that the preferred parameterization varies systematically with the data representation and model capacity -- notably, increasing model capacity shifts preference toward velocity prediction. We evaluate MFlow across ImageNet, UCF-101 video, and large-scale text-to-image generation, demonstrating competitive or improved generative performance across diverse settings. In addition, we find that vanilla pixel diffusion transformers, irrespective of parameterization, retain a persistent high-frequency deficit relative to real images. To address this, we introduce ConvRefiner, a lightweight convolutional module trained post-hoc with an adversarial loss while keeping the diffusion backbone frozen. With only a small amount of additional training, ConvRefiner restores the high-frequency statistics of generated images while preserving FID. Project webpage: this https URL.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.23854
Deep neural networks demonstrate remarkable generalization despite being highly over-parameterized, challenging traditional statistical learning theories. While several theoretical paradigms such as margin-based bounds, PAC-Bayesian analyses, and neural tangent kernels provide global explanations, they often lack mechanistic insight into how generalization emerges from training dynamics. We introduce Neural Expansion, a unified geometric framework that characterizes generalization through the expansion of directionally-selective ray coverage in the input space. Using Generalization Intervals (GIs), we quantify direction-specific regions around training samples where the model's predictions remain stable. Our extensive empirical studies across diverse architectures and datasets reveal that training leads to progressive expansion of ray coverage, particularly along directions with low Jacobian singular values. This mechanism helps explain a large fraction of correctly classified test inputs, adversarial examples, and even mislabeled or out-of-distribution samples through the geometry of ray coverage rather than instance-level memorization. By connecting input-space curvature to predictive behavior, our framework provides a mechanistic foundation that complements existing global theories of deep learning.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.23716
Self-supervised speech models such as WavLM achieve strong spoofing detection performance, yet which layers encode the most spoof-relevant information and what acoustic properties they capture remain opaque. We present a layer-wise interpretability study of WavLM using the ASVspoof 5 database, combining three complementary analyses: (i) per-layer linear probing with attack-level evaluation across speech synthesis, voice conversion, and adversarial attacks; (ii) a canonical correlation analysis (CCA) linking layer representations to spoofing-relevant acoustic features; (iii) an exhaustive grid search over layer subsets showing that use of five layers outperforms full thirteen-layer pooling. CCA analysis reveals that, while most acoustic features peak in alignment with mid-layers and then decay, voice quality measures jitter, shimmer, and the harmonics-to-noise ratio show the opposite trend, with correlation increasing toward later layers. Embedding visualisations reveal that deeper layers capture a continuous acoustic similarity among attacks rather than discrete categories, suggesting these layers encode fundamental synthesis artifacts rather than attack-specific signatures.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.23526
Graph Large Language Models (GraphLLMs) enable powerful semantic understanding and reasoning over Text-Attributed Graphs (TAGs), while their semantic reasoning may exhibit vulnerabilities to perturbations in node text and graph structure under adversarial attack evaluation. Existing attacks typically construct textual and structural perturbations in separate stages guided by distinct realization intents. However, this separation results in attack-intent fragmentation, causing semantic incoherence between the two perturbation types, thereby undermining attack stealth and making them easier for GraphLLMs to identify and disregard, ultimately weakening attack effectiveness. To avoid attack-intent fragmentation, we propose the Graph Attack Primitive (GAP), an atomic semantic representation that unifies textual and structural perturbations under a coherent attack intent. By carefully calibrating the semantic composition of a GAP, we can achieve strong attack effectiveness while maintaining sufficient attack stealth. Furthermore, we introduce S-GAP (Stealthy GAP), a multi-agent framework that iteratively refines the semantic content of the GAP. The framework unifies GAP planning and realization and continuously refines this process through surrogate evaluation and textual feedback. Extensive experiments across four datasets, three GraphLLMs, and two attack settings show that S-GAP improves ASR over the strongest baselines by 7.02% on average while producing more relationally plausible perturbations, exposing critical vulnerabilities in current GraphLLMs and motivating more robust defenses.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.23465
AI agents have increasingly interacted with external environments by invoking tools, with Model Context Protocol (MCP) emerging as a standard interface for connecting agents to heterogeneous tools and services. As organizations deploy agents at scale, MCP gateways have become a critical middleware layer for aggregating, governing, and shaping the tool surface exposed to agents. Despite the growing importance of MCP gateways in agentic systems, no prior work has systematically studied how gateway design affects agent capability, efficiency, and security. To address this gap, we introduce GatewayBench, the first unified evaluation framework and benchmark for MCP gateways. We characterize gateway architectures into two major paradigms: flattened gateways and hierarchical gateways. GatewayBench comprises 524 tasks across six domains, together with a pool of 11,118 real-world tools from 251 authentic MCP servers. To emulate large-scale deployments, we systematically inject task-irrelevant tools sampled from this pool into each agent environment, enabling controlled evaluation as the accessible tool surface scales. Based on GatewayBench, we conduct extensive experiments across seven widely deployed MCP gateways and diverse agent configurations, covering both benign and adversarial tasks. Our results reveal substantial differences across gateway designs in task completion, tool-use efficiency, and resilience to attacks, and further demonstrate that these effects interact strongly with the underlying model and agent harness. These findings highlight the MCP gateway as a consequential yet underexplored component of the agentic AI stack. By enabling controlled evaluation of gateway architectures under realistic tool ecosystems, GatewayBench provides both practical guidance for MCP gateway design and a rigorous testbed for developing more capable, efficient, and secure agentic systems.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.23449
This study investigates CT-to-PET image synthesis using TransNSNet, a Transformer-enhanced multi-scale adversarial framework. A paired CT-PET dataset was curated from the public non-small cell lung cancer (NSCLC) Radiogenomics collection through patient screening, slice-level matching, preprocessing, and patient-level train-test separation. The proposed framework generates PET-like predictions at multiple spatial scales and applies coarse-to-fine reconstruction supervision, while TransPatchGAN introduces contextual feature interaction into adversarial evaluation. A progressive ablation study compares Pix2Pix, NSNet-Base, NSNet-D, and TransNSNet. Image-level performance was summarized over a fixed convergence window (epochs 80-101) from one training run per model. TransNSNet achieved the best mean value in nine of ten metrics, whereas NSNet-Base achieved the highest visual saliency-induced index. For fixed-fraction high-intensity regions, NSNet-D was marginally higher in slice-level recall and balanced accuracy, but the equal-weight patient-level values were nearly identical and the highest Dice values shifted to TransNSNet. These differences were small relative to between-patient variability. In the separate adaptive patient-level analysis (n=10), no pairwise model difference remained statistically significant after Holm correction. TransNSNet also had a substantially smaller parameter footprint than the original next-scale models. These findings indicate promising image-quality trends, but they do not establish statistical superiority or clinical validity; synthesized PET-like images should not be interpreted as substitutes for clinically acquired PET.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.23325
Coding agents use execution harnesses to constrain the consequences of prompt injection by enforcing permission boundaries. These systems deterministically intercept any out-of-sandbox action and prompt the user for approval. To reduce approval fatigue, users can approve allow-rules proposed by the agent, after which any future action matching the rule is allowed without a prompt. In this work, we show that this mechanism introduces a new risk: untrusted context can influence the permissions presented for approval, with consequences extending beyond the immediate task. We investigate privilege escalation targeting this permission-update process. Specifically, adversarial context planted in a repository can reliably steer an agent performing a routine task into requesting a plausibly justified, yet dangerously broad allow-rule. If the user approves the request, the saved rule can effectively blind the harness, enabling adversaries to execute malicious actions that would otherwise require approval, without triggering human oversight. Across production platforms, including Claude Code and Codex CLI, we demonstrate that agents successfully elicit the target allow-rules in 58% of experimental instances. Once acquired, these rules exhibit a massive semantic blast radius, covering 56.9% of category-specific capability test cases. To further quantify the downstream risk, we show that conditional on rule approval, our exploit achieves verified, silent goal completion in 47 of the 58 eligible instances (81.0%), undermining the safety promise of human-in-the-loop oversight.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.22987
As large language models (LLMs) generate increasingly fluent text, the need for reliable detection of LLM-generated content has grown substantially. However, existing research remains heavily English-centric, leaving Korean largely underexplored. Moreover, current evaluations of Korean text detection often rely on superficial cues, leading to overly optimistic estimates of detection performance. To address these limitations, we introduce \textsc{KoLing}, a bias-controlled adversarial benchmark comprising 50.9k instances that suppresses superficial shortcuts while preserving semantic content and separately evaluates LLM-generated and LLM-modified text detection. We further propose KoLingProbe, an interpretable detector grounded in theoretical linguistics that models Korean-specific properties across multiple linguistic levels. Experiments show that KoLingProbe substantially outperforms strong baselines on all detection tasks while remaining robust to adversarial attacks. Our analyses further reveal that integrating complementary linguistic features across multiple levels yields both improved performance and interpretability.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.22940
LLMs over external data face a per-instruction tension: a single document or tool return often interleaves legitimate directives with adversarial prompt injections, and the model must follow the former while rejecting the latter. Existing defenses suppress or trust all external instructions, collapsing the safety-utility frontier and forcing a choice between over-refusal and over-compliance. We argue the missing capability is \textbf{per-instruction credit attribution} and formalize it as External-Data Instruction Classification, an identify-classify-act decision over each embedded directive. We propose \textbf{EDIC}, a decomposed reward framework for per-instruction compliance. A scene-grounded pipeline injects mixed beneficial and harmful instructions with counterfactual filtering, while a generative judge is initialized by SFT and refined with GRPO to attribute compliance at the instruction level. The judge then produces a reward that separately encourages beneficial compliance and penalizes harmful compliance for RL training. Across two backbones and five benchmarks, EDIC improves both safety and utility over the strongest prior defense, lifting harmful-rejection by up to 7.7\% and Arena-Hard-Auto utility by 12.5\% on Qwen3-4B. The code repository is hosted at this https URL.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.22874