Abstract
Natural Language Autoencoders (NLAs) express a model's internal activations in the form of readable text. The verbalizer turns an activation into an English explanation; the reconstructor then converts that explanation back into an activation, and the explanation is considered successful if the round trip brings back the original activation. We claim that this criterion evaluates whether the information is sufficient and does not address descriptive faithfulness. A sentence can contain sufficient information to make it possible to identify an activation even if it wrongly explains what the activation does: in the case of reconstruction, the primary aim is to accurately identify the activations and not to describe them. This issue has the same structure as the chain-of-thought faithfulness problem, in which verbal output that has been trained to go with a process is taken as a report on that process, and it parallels the dissociation between an individual's introspective report and the actual governing process as documented in human psychology. Although proposed as interpretability tools for the purpose of alignment, NLAs reintroduce, through unverified explanations, the epistemic problem that they were intended to resolve.
Abstract (translated)
URL
https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.32691
