Abstract
Temporal reasoning is widely assumed to decompose into two modes: temporal arithmetic (date and time calculations), and temporal semantics (understanding temporal and causal relations). This dichotomy shapes how benchmarks are designed, how models are trained, and how progress is measured, yet its empirical validity has never been directly tested. We provide two lines of evidence that challenge it. First, we test whether tasks labelled as arithmetic or semantic by the benchmarks support transferable gains within their purported mode. Finetuning on these subsets yields predominantly dataset-specific gains ($+6.8$ to $+23.1$ percentage points), while transfer to a different dataset in the same mode ranges from $-3.2$ to $+1.1$ percentage points. Across the two benchmark families used in the transfer analysis, this pattern provides little evidence of coherent, transferable temporal abilities. Second, using cognitive-demand-based model evaluation, we examine which capabilities actually drive performance on these benchmarks. We find that quantitative and logical reasoning, the assumed proxies for temporal arithmetic and temporal semantics, are not the primary drivers; knowledge is. Together, these findings show that current temporal reasoning benchmarks do not cleanly realise the arithmetic-semantics distinction and instead largely reward models for remembering how time typically works.
Abstract (translated)
URL
https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.29507
