Abstract
LLMs have been used to simulate human decision-making in professional settings, yet their behaviors in common-law jury trials remain unexplored. We study when and how a defendant's courtroom statement affects LLM-simulated jurors, focusing on persuasion, ideological bias, and background-based affinity. To support the analysis, we introduce JuryBench, a benchmark containing controversial criminal cases in U.S. criminal law. In each case, a defendant can claim various plausible justifications to support acquittal or reduced liability. We fix the base case and design defendants of different backgrounds, who give courtroom statements with varying emotional appeal or rebuttal. Jurors with diverse ideological profiles across the spectrum are simulated. We examine 20 frontier LLMs, resulting in a total of 432K decisions and rationales, and quantify changes in verdict severity. Our findings show that LLM-jury simulation echoes many human-jury findings. First, emotional persuasion can be detrimental, since jurors may perceive it as evidence of guilt or inconsistency. Next, we show that background fit between jurors and defendants is a stronger and significant factor than other isolated factors, and that jurors are in general harsher toward opposite-background defendants and lenient toward same-background ones. Finally, we find that juror ideology also strongly shapes severity judgments. These findings highlight both the promise and risks of using LLMs to model jury reasoning and call for careful evaluation. The data and code are available at this https URL
Abstract (translated)
URL
https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.09887
