Abstract
Scientific fraud is the instrument of doubt that malicious entities can use to establish controversy in science. Historically, it required the resources of a company: deep pockets, ghostwritten articles, and corrupt academics. Today, Artificial Intelligence (AI) is increasingly automating scientific research, so we ask: Can a remote adversary weaponize the honest use of AI in science to compromise scientific integrity? We envision and empirically evaluate a new attack, indirect data poisoning, in which an adversary corrupts an open dataset and uploads the poisoned variant to a public repository. Autonomous research agents may independently retrieve and process this data, turning honest scientists into the unpaid and unwitting distributors of fraud at scale. Across five socially-salient topics, from hiring discrimination to the safety of autonomous vehicles, three widely used frontier AI systems (Claude Code with Claude Opus 4.7, Codex with GPT-5.5, Gemini CLI with Gemini 3.1 Pro), and 450 ethically contained experimental runs, we find that poisoning succeeds in 49.56% of runs, while the rate of poisoning detection is only 6.0%. The attack requires no topic-specific trigger-words, agent access, indirect prompt injection, or fabricated papers, only the open data ecosystem and misleading metadata. To mitigate the attacks, we propose and evaluate two measures: a scientist persona and a data provenance audit with five checks (referencing papers, social markers, statistical anomalies, related datasets, poisoning caution). We find that the persona still leaves 16.67% of runs with a poisoned conclusion, but provenance auditing reduces attack success rate to zero. Our results suggest that indirect data poisoning may enable scientific fraud at unprecedented scale, but these attacks can be mitigated with suitable auditing by agents during data retrieval.
Abstract (translated)
URL
https://arxiv.org/abs/2607.10712
