Deepfake speech detectors are typically evaluated as binary classifiers on fixed benchmarks, but deployed systems face evolving attacks, codecs, speakers, and recording conditions, with labels unavailable during operation. This makes it difficult to know when a detector operates in familiar conditions and can be relied on. We propose an unsupervised drift monitor that operates on the internal embeddings of a deployed detector. The monitor compares each input against bona fide and spoof references using regularized Mahalanobis distances. These distances define trusted, ambiguous, and novel regions of the detector embedding space, allowing unfamiliar inputs to be routed for review. We evaluate the monitor on four modern detectors on three datasets. The monitor raises alerts for dataset mismatches and substantially reduces the security-critical case of accepting deepfakes at the cost of reduced automatic coverage. The results also show that drift affects both classes: bona fide recordings can move away from the training reference, increasing alert rates even in in-domain settings. Our findings suggest that deployed deepfake speech detectors should be treated not only as a binary classification, but also as a reliability problem.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.16826
Adversarial detection on evolving attributed graphs faces two challenges: fraud labels arrive late or not at all, and natural distributional drift erodes any trained decision boundary. Modern detectors can reach strong detection rates when labels are available and the distribution is stationary; sustaining that quality without labels and under drift is the open problem. We identify feature-context consistency -- the alignment between a node's attributes and its aggregated neighborhood attributes -- as a single structural signal that addresses both. We formalize it as the Context Boost (CB) score within a Restricted Boltzmann Machine framework (CB-RBM) and prove two complementary worst-case guarantees: a strict separation between the expected CB of legitimate and adversarial nodes, with gap growing linearly in model capacity, whenever the adversary's context stays far enough from legitimate neighborhood context; and a Wasserstein-Lipschitz bound on how far the CB distribution moves under natural drift. We validate on XBlock Ethereum phishing (~153K nodes) and Reddit banned-user detection (~11K nodes), with two further datasets in the appendix spanning diverse domains. With zero labels, CB-RBM achieves AUROC >= 0.96 on four adversarial attacks and keeps FPR close to its calibrated 5% target under drift -- outperforming supervised GNNs (hundreds of labels), unsupervised graph-anomaly baselines, and a standard RBM whose FPR collapses to 89-100%. What typically requires separate mechanisms -- label-free operation and drift stability -- here follows from a single structural regularity of the data. Code: this https URL.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.16694
An LLM agent using tools can fail silently. It stops before the task is done, raises no error, and answers fluently. Two kinds of monitor address this, one deciding whether a run failed and the other naming the step where failure became unavoidable. Much of the reported performance on both tasks comes from regularities that need no model. Failing runs are longer, and the step labelled decisive is usually the last. A rule that always names the last step is correct $67\%$ to $96\%$ of the time here, without reading the run at all. That ceiling reflects how the labels were written, not how agents break. On failures whose decisive step replay can confirm, it falls to near chance. Reporting gain over that rule therefore changes what a score means. Under that correction, methods tested here gain nothing on give-up failures, while several published systems keep a clear advantage on other splits. For detection, the agent's internal states beat transcript length and text similarity on the agent benchmark, and hold up where the text baseline does not. Precision stays low when failures are rare, so such a monitor should rank runs for review, not replace it.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.16661
Pseudonymous accounts and complex smart-contract ecosystems substantially hinder the tracing of illicit cryptocurrency fund flows. Existing Graph Neural Networks (GNNs) have achieved promising performance in blockchain fraud detection, yet their static node- or edge-level predictions do not naturally generalize to multi-hop fund tracing. Meanwhile, existing tracing methods mainly rely on predefined heuristics to capture multi-hop relationships, limiting their adaptive reasoning capabilities. To bridge this gap, we introduce CryptoFlowBench, a benchmark constructed from authoritative reports on cryptocurrency-related illicit incidents, with four tasks spanning local to multi-hop fund tracing. These tasks pose substantial challenges to existing learning- and heuristic-based methods, particularly in complex multi-hop scenarios. We therefore propose ChainSleuth, a graph-tool-augmented agent that iteratively reasons, invokes graph tools, and updates its tracing trajectory, enabling adaptive information acquisition and recovery from erroneous paths. Experiments show that no baseline consistently dominates all four tasks, revealing substantial gaps between local fraud detection and multi-hop fund tracing. ChainSleuth achieves notable improvements on multi-hop tasks, demonstrating the potential of agentic graph reasoning for cryptocurrency fund investigation.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.16449
Time series (TS) anomaly detection (AD) lacks a universal detector, with the best choice determined by the series rather than by the algorithm. Existing methods therefore either select one detector for each series or average a pool of them. However, both assume that no label ever arrives, while a deployed monitor does receive them, since an operator confirms the alarms it raises. In this paper, we propose ONESHOT, which uses a single confirmed anomaly to weight the pool rather than to choose one detector from it. Specifically, we score each detector on the confirmed anomaly, and those scores become the weights of a soft mixture over the whole pool. We show that a single confirmed anomaly is enough to come close to the best detector for the series. Across 152 univariate and 73 multivariate series, ONESHOT outperforms the strongest single detector, averaging the whole pool, and even picking the best detector on the confirmed event. Code is available at: this https URL.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.16219
Although post-training significantly enhances model performance, the use of massive undisclosed data raises concerns about benchmark contamination and copyright infringement. This drives growing interest in training data detection for post-trained models. Existing evaluations for training data detection often leverage benchmarks constructed post hoc, which can introduce distribution shifts. Alternatively, controlled evaluations rely on small-scale training setups that diverge from realistic post-training settings. As a result, their reported performance may not faithfully reflect the effectiveness of detection methods in real-world scenarios. To this end, we introduce \textsc{\method}, a reliable benchmark designed to evaluate detection methods in realistic, large-scale post-training settings. Built on a multi-stage pipeline, \method\space encompasses stage-specific models throughout the post-training lifecycle, spanning SFT, DPO, and RL. To perform a reliable evaluation, we construct model-specific evaluation sets across four diverse tasks, featuring distribution-matched members and non-members with verifiable membership labels. Our results reveal that even the best-performing method achieves an average AUC of only 0.529 on our benchmark, which approaches random-guessing level (0.5). Furthermore, our analysis suggests that evaluation protocols can significantly affect measured detection performance. These findings highlight the significant potential for developing effective, practical, and robust detection methods under realistic scenarios.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.16152
LLM agents increasingly operate over multiple entities, where reliable response generation requires not only retrieving relevant evidence but also preserving its association with the correct entity. We identify Phantom Merge (PM), an entity-evidence binding failure in which an agent attributes unsupported claims to its committed entity, potentially even when the task is completed correctly. We formalize PM at the claim level and characterize its prevalence and error subtypes across four agent domains and four backbone families. To address this problem, we propose a two-stage framework for claim-level risk estimation and correction. First, Anchor-Grounded Risk (AGR) combines a representational readout of the agent's pre-emission hidden state with Jacobian-based functional information, providing complementary slot-level and anchor-value risk scores. Second, Fixed-Anchor Correction (FAC) audits flagged claims and selectively revises them using observed anchor evidence or removes them when no supported replacement is available. On the held-out Shopping detection cohort, AGR-slot achieves an AUROC of 96.2% and an average precision of 97.3%, outperforming the evaluated detection baselines. In the end-to-end Shopping mitigation evaluation, FAC reduces trajectory-level PM from 51.4% to 6.2%, with an output-to-original claim ratio of 80.7%. These results demonstrate the prevalence of entity-specific grounding failures and the effectiveness of combining internal risk estimation with evidence-constrained claim correction. Our code is publicly available at this https URL.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.16141
Existing audio deepfake detection (ADD) methods frequently exhibit limited generalization, as fixed bottleneck architectures fail to adapt to the heterogeneous information densities inherent in diverse spoofing artifacts. Moreover, standard augmentation often leads to a pathological robustness-accuracy trade-off. In this paper, we propose a unified ADD framework to address these challenges. Our approach integrates: (1) an Adaptive Audio Feature Integration (AAFI) module that dynamically selects optimal latent dimensions via a compression pool and a stochastic exploration mechanism, ensuring flexible representations across multiple types of dynamic attacks; and (2) a Mel-Band Adversarial Perturbation (Mel-BAP) strategy that applies targeted regularization in the mel-spectrogram domain to encourage the model to learn invariant decision boundaries. Extensive evaluations on benchmarks including ADD 2022, FakeOrReal, and In-the-Wild demonstrate that our model based on Whisper-small achieves a state-of-the-art average Equal Error Rate (EER) of 1.51%. Compared to existing SOTA models such as the 3-billion-parameter Resemble-Detect-3B-Omni, our framework reduces the parameter count by up to 91.6% while achieving a 60.7% improvement in average EER. In a separate cross-lingual evaluation, the Whisper-base configuration achieves EERs of 3.91-5.65% on five unseen languages. The framework also maintains strong resilience to real-world acoustic distortions. This work provides a scalable and efficient "plug-in" solution for enhancing trust and security in the audio Web ecosystem.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.16049
Large language models (LLMs) have achieved remarkable success across a wide range of language tasks. At their core, autoregressive LLMs are conditional probability models that learn to approximate the next-token distribution given the preceding context. Despite this probabilistic nature, the stochastic dynamics of autoregressive decoding have rarely been investigated from a rigorous probabilistic perspective. In this work, we define the per-step prediction error as the difference between the sampled token indicator and the model's conditional predictive distribution, and prove that the cumulative error process is a martingale with respect to the decoding filtration, implying that its conditional first-order moment is identically zero. Beyond this first-order property, we derive a closed-form expression for the second-order behavior of the martingale sequence: its predictable quadratic variation reduces to $\sum_t\left(1-p(y_t\mid y_{<t})\right)$, computable from realized token probabilities alone. This identity establishes a direct theoretical connection between sequence fluctuations and predictive uncertainty during autoregressive decoding. White-box experiments on Llama-3.x and Qwen2.5 families (1B to 72B parameters) verify that the empirically measured second-order moments closely match the theoretical predictions derived from our martingale analysis. These results provide a probabilistic framework for analyzing autoregressive LLM decoding, reveal intrinsic probabilistic fingerprints of different language models, and establish a rigorous mathematical foundation for LLM-generated text detection and uncertainty quantification.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.16041
Multi-agent LLM systems (MALS) introduce a privacy-leakage problem that conventional sensitivity-based defenses miss, since information disclosed to one authorized agent can propagate through routine coordination to an unauthorized one, without compromise or malicious behavior. This motivates topology-aware enforcement that blocks unauthorized propagation while preserving authorized disclosure. We evaluate 485 scenarios across coordinator-worker, peer-to-peer, and hierarchical topologies, instrumenting seven communication channels and measuring surface leakage and disclosure to topology-introduced recipients. We introduce RECONS, a Detect -> Decide -> Transform sanitizer conditioning intervention on recipient and execution context rather than sensitivity alone. Topology changes where protected information propagates, with disclosure to topology-introduced recipients rising from 0% to 52.2% while surface leakage stays nearly flat at 60.6-62.8%. This effect persists across four generator models and a second orchestration framework, though magnitude and relay paths differ; framework choice separately drives a 150x leakage spread, so topology alone is not sufficient. RECONS reduces residual disclosure from 96.7% without sanitization to 29.25%, preserving 94.1% of authorized disclosures versus 20.5% under blanket redaction. Detection coverage is the dominant bottleneck, accounting for 95.5% of residual disclosures. These results show that privacy enforcement in MALS must reason about the recipient and communication path realized at runtime, not sensitivity or topology assumptions alone.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.16039
Ransomware is a fast-escalating privacy threat causing significant financial and data losses worldwide. As attacks grow more sophisticated, traditional static signatures and dynamic behavior analysis struggle to defend. In this paper, we propose an novel framework that couples software-level scanning with hardware-level microprocessor activity monitoring to achieve efficient ransomware detection and mitigation. The contributions are threefold: (1) we employ adversarial training to harden static analysis against obfuscation and leverage hardware-assisted monitoring for real-time detection; (2) we integrate neural architecture search (NAS) to automatically tailor models for stronger generalizability; and (3) We validate the proposed approach through extensive experiments, demonstrating substantially improved detection accuracy and reduced latency compared with existing methods. Moreover, it provides trace-level interpretability that explains the underlying decision process.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.15951
Text wrapped in a trigger can be made behaviorally invisible to a language model: omitted from summaries and quotations, ignored in question answering, and left unflagged by downstream filtering. We study this selective blindness as a dual-use information-flow primitive, a supply-chain backdoor, and a white-box auditing problem. We first implement it exactly as a serving-time span veto: blocking information flow out of a marked span makes every outside activation bit-identical under same-length substitution of the span's content, a noninterference property we verify across ten models, seven mixer families, and 0.5B-120B parameters. The veto serves as a deployable quarantine, an exact reference for calibrating leakage, and a teacher. Distilled into weights, it yields a backdoor: checkpoints trained on six model families from 4B to 120B ignore marked context at little benchmark cost, and their outputs show no measurable semantic trace of the suppressed content above the veto reference on our held-out suite; an in-domain variant suppresses planted vulnerabilities during AI code review. Detection is therefore a white-box problem. Simpler backdoors remain internally transparent -- linear probes recover suppressed content at 0.57-0.79 accuracy versus 0.025 chance -- but hardening the attack until probes reach chance collapses attention from outside the span into it below the range of base models. Across the attacks we evaluate, probe visibility trades off against routing visibility; we do not establish that this tradeoff is fundamental.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.15883
We study how to detect and mitigate visual attention sinks in vision-language models (VLMs). Visual attention sinks are image tokens that absorb a large share of attention over the image regardless of the query or task, and they mislead methods that treat attention maps as a record of where the model ``looked.'' Prior work has detected sinks through massive activation dimensions and proposed redistributing their attention, but none have addressed what makes a token become a sink. Comparing six candidate detectors on ten VLMs from four families, we find that only the centered cosine similarity between an image token's key and the key of the language model's text-sink detects visual sinks. Thus, a visual sink is an image token whose key aligns with the text-sink's key. Moving a sink's key component along this direction to the median of the image keys sends its attention back to the text-sink (\textbf{Are Borrowed}) while leaving model answers unchanged~(\textbf{Not Seen}). Building on this, we propose a training-free, entropy-triggered re-look that first cleans the attention map, then crops the most-attended region of the cleaned map and inserts it into the reasoning trace. Cleaning adds negligible computation to the forward pass, and the re-look improves accuracy with a mean gain of $+4.3$ points on fine-detail VQA benchmarks across model families.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.15855
Automated moderation systems are deployed at scale, yet they remain opaque to the users and moderators affected by their decisions, and their coverage is almost entirely confined to English. For Urdu written in the Nastaliq script, no such system exists, and the annotated resources it would be built on are drawn largely from Twitter/X, where character limits constrain how users write. Interpretability has received little attention, leaving it unclear what such models actually learn. This study addresses these gaps in three steps. First, we curate and publicly release a corpus of 7604 Nastaliq Urdu Facebook comments, extending an earlier corpus by correcting text-level inconsistencies and re-examining the original labels. Second, we fine-tune four Urdu-capable transformers under a common grid-search protocol and compare them against twelve feature-classifier baselines on identical data partitions. The best configuration, Multilingual Representations for Indian Languages (MuRIL), reaches 87.05% accuracy and 87.06% macro F1, improving on the strongest baseline by 5.52 percentage points, a margin that exceeds the 95% confidence interval on test accuracy; the two leading transformers differ by less than the test set can resolve, and performance is stable across five optimizers. Third, we compute word-level SHAP attributions adapted to right-to-left rendering. Attribution mass concentrates on high-frequency slurs but extends to syntactically neutral function words and to political vocabulary characteristic of the source pages, indicating that aggregate performance may rest partly on lexical and topical regularities rather than a generalizable representation of offensiveness.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.15795
Long-term memory for assistants needs a gate that decides when a new utterance retires an old stored claim. Benchmark labels for this step mark a pair as changed or not, so they cannot tell a gate that acts on established change from one that acts on a hint. We write a task contract that separates the two (SUPERSEDED vs. NEEDS-CONFIRMATION vs. COMPATIBLE), label 500 test pairs built from STALE (change pairs plus same-user controls) with three LLM annotators and two human adjudicators (one author and a second annotator; provenance reported), and evaluate Jev, a typed "System One" decision model, under pre-registered hypotheses. Of the 179 test pairs STALE marks as changed, 72 meet the contract's bar for an established change. Jev never retired a claim on 141 same-conversation non-changes. Its failure is premature retirement: the binary gate retires 39.2% of claims whose change is only suggested. A three-way decision cuts this to 15.5% at a 15.3-point detection cost, which misses our pre-registered 10-point budget, and it lands on the binary gate's own threshold frontier; these verdicts hold under three readings of the gold labels. On a held-out vault scored against a second annotator's labels, a cascade that escalated uncertain cases to a reasoning model and looked best on development data was indistinguishable from simply raising the threshold (premature retirement 26.8% vs. 6.5% on dev). Part of the gap comes from the gold labels: relative to that annotator's reading, LLM-majority gold shares most of its errors with a same-family escalation model, and an identity for binary labels says how much such shared errors hide. The rest is small-sample selection on development data. For builders this means a binary score should not be wired to delete: route suggested changes to pending evidence, and do not trust a cascade selected on development data of this size.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.15710
Conventional distillation transfers capability through teacher-generated demonstrations. LLM-as-a-Judge knowledge distillation offers a distinct and increasingly practical alternative. In the label-only variant studied here, the student generates every response and improves from scalar scores alone. Prior work shows that this non-demonstrative feedback can improve student capability, but it creates a fundamentally different provenance problem. No teacher-generated answer enters the student's training set, so any evaluator-specific trace must pass through a low-bandwidth reward signal rather than copied text. Existing watermarks and distillation detectors do not cover this score-only channel. We introduce Radioactive Feedback, which encodes a registered pattern of behavioral preferences in the rewards themselves. The evaluator applies bounded pointwise adjustments to quality-qualified responses, allowing repeated optimization to transfer the pattern to a student trained by another party. Experiments on code and mathematics show that the registered preferences transfer through scores alone and across datasets, enabling black-box detection against a fixed reference pool.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.15685
Sleep-disordered breathing, including snoring, hypopnea, and obstructive apnea, is the hallmark of obstructive sleep apnea, whose severity is quantified by the Apnea-Hypopnea Index (AHI). As conventional polysomnography is costly and clin- ically demanding, microphone-only detection has emerged as a noninvasive alternative for screening. We propose ALE- Confidence Fusion Sound Event Detection (ACF-SED), the first framework that directly injects the per-frame confidence map of an Adaptive Line Enhancer (ALE) into Transformer atten- tion biasing and feature modulation, rather than as mere pre- processing. A Multi-Resolution ALE Bank aggregates three parallel NLMS filters at distinct decorrelation delays, while a Confidence-Guided Cross-Path block couples event and noise streams via gated cross-attention. On the Audio-Polygraphy Dataset for Sleep Apnea Analysis, ACF-SED achieves state- of-the-art detection across Event-F1, Segment-F1, and PSDS, enabling end-to-end AHI estimation.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.15532
With the rapid proliferation of social media, harmful memes have become a growing threat to online ecosystems. Their harmfulness is often implicitly conveyed through complex interactions among visual, textual, and contextual cues, making accurate detection challenging. Recent studies have introduced Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) and external knowledge into harmful meme detection. However, existing methods mainly retrieve similar instances or auxiliary information, limiting their ability to capture reusable harmfulness knowledge and underlying reasoning mechanisms, and thus constraining both detection performance and interpretability. To address these challenges, we propose MemeLogos, a knowledge-driven retrieval-augmented reasoning framework for harmful meme detection. MemeLogos abstracts recurring harmfulness patterns and reasoning structures from diverse harmful cases into reusable knowledge units and organizes them into a dedicated star-shaped knowledge graph. By combining structured knowledge retrieval with an explicit multi-stage reasoning process inspired by cognitive mechanisms, MemeLogos leverages retrieved knowledge to guide harmfulness reasoning, improving both detection reliability and interpretability. Extensive experiments show that MemeLogos consistently outperforms existing harmful meme detection methods while generating more coherent and interpretable reasoning, demonstrating the effectiveness of structured harmfulness knowledge for multimodal content understanding.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.15463
LLM-based multi-agent systems (LLM-MAS) use specialized agents that exchange messages to accomplish complex tasks. Their reliance on networked protocols, remote tools, and model endpoints exposes communication to message loss, delay, and context expiration. Because agents often exchange open-ended natural language, anomalies can alter task-relevant information while leaving messages processable, allowing semantic errors to propagate through subsequent interactions. Systematic studies of faults in inter-agent communication remain limited. This paper presents a large-scale empirical study of how communication faults manifest, propagate, and affect task outcomes in LLM-MAS. We construct a cross-layer taxonomy linking lower-stack disturbances to application-visible faults and develop a fault-injection and tracing pipeline. Our evaluation covers more than 29,000 executions across 100 tasks, five domains, three workflow topologies, and three model configurations. We find that 20.7% of failures with complete detection records occur without an immediate failure signal, reaching 76.2% for partial-content faults. Flat maintains 53.0% task success under communication faults, compared with 3.3% and 3.2% for Sequential and Hierarchical, respectively. This advantage primarily arises when an alternative information path preserves the evidence required by downstream agents. We also evaluate execution-side and evidence protection mechanisms and find that they recover different failure cases. Evidence recovery depends on whether trustworthy information remains accessible through an unaffected path. These observations provide empirical insights into communication-fault propagation, workflow resilience, and protection design for LLM-MAS.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.15459
Before an agent acts, it must decide whether action is warranted. A single accuracy cannot distinguish failure to recognize a warranted action from reluctance to act. Signal-detection theory separates sensitivity from criterion, but criteria estimated from authored binary labels depend on each benchmark's example mix. We introduce FlipAct, a diagnostic of tool use in physical states. A rule over annotated tool properties computes each answer and a graded evidence score, fixing the Yes/No boundary at zero across models. Questions form 2-by-2 quads that hold required knowledge fixed while the state flips. The slope of the fitted Yes-rate curve measures sensitivity; its crossing at one half measures criterion. Across 44 open models, sensitivity rises with size within a family, and its ranking agrees with three of four external when-to-act benchmarks. Models respond to evidence sign rather than magnitude, accepting actions that leave the state no better about as often as helpful ones. When Yes means act, most models are conservative across rephrasings; in some, this partly reflects a preference for No. Criterion is not determined by size. Activation steering shifts criterion with weights fixed; distillation from a model's own steered copy puts the shift into its weights without a significant sensitivity change. The distilled shift transfers to six external benchmarks, including two without Yes/No answers, while criterion-free AUC is preserved on the five benchmarks where it is available. Accuracy improves where models start conservative and declines or remains within error where they start permissive. Project page: this https URL
https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.15415